Cases: Woodward

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Louise Woodward

• Brief of Defendant-Appellant, On Appeal from a Judgment and Order of the Superior Court January 27, 1998
• Brief of Defendant-Appellee, On Appeal from a Judgment and Order of the Superior Court February 24, 1998
• Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, On Appeal from a Judgment and Order of the Superior Court March 2, 1998
• Louise Woodward's Post-Argument Brief March 10, 1998

Silverglate & Good was co-counsel in the defense of Louise Woodward against a first-degree murder indictment growing out of the death of an 8-month old infant, Matthew Eappen, who was in her care when he collapsed and was taken to Boston's Children's Hospital on February 4, 1997.

The principal dispute at the jury trial, which was televised in full and began on October 5, 1997, was a medical and scientific one: whether the skull fracture and subdural hematoma suffered by Matthew Eappen were the result of his head having been violently slammed against a fixed, hard surface with force equivalent to a fall from a second story window onto concrete, and violently shaken for about a minute, while he was in Louise Woodward's sole custody on February 4, 1997. The defense contended that the head injuries had been the result of far less violent force, were weeks old, and may well have occurred at the same time that Matthew suffered a previously undetected wrist fracture.

The prosecution's expert witnesses stated their opinions that the skull fracture and subdural hematoma were inflicted by violent trauma on February 4,1997, even though under cross examination by co-counsel, Barry Scheck, it was established, among other things, that: (1) the force of the violent slam would have had to have passed through the scalp in order to cause the fracture, yet the exquisitely sensitive, pre-operative CT scan detected no evidence of injury or swelling anywhere on the scalp; (2) the pre-operative CT scan showed that the subdural hematoma was "layered", which is indicative that the bleeding that led to the pooling of blood in the hematoma had been intermittent rather than uninterrupted and all at once; (3) serum, which is produced as a result of lengthy clotting process, rather than pure cerebro-spinal fluid, shot out when emergency surgery was performed to relieve pressure inside the infant's head, indicating an older, partially resolved injury; (4) a pre-operative drawing made by the physician who observed retinal hemorrhages in Matthew's eyes showed that they were not the type of hemorrhages which the prosecution's expert assumed were present as a basis for her opinion that the trauma, including violent shaking, occurred within hours of the pre-operative eye examination; (5) the skull fracture tissue and portions of the dural membrane had been released for burial, precluding the defense from testing the tissue to determine the fracture's age, even though relatively simple tests of the skull fracture would have produced extremely reliable evidence of the age of that fracture and would have powerfully corroborated other evidence of an old injury; (6) there were cells on the outside surface of the dural membrane at the skull fracture site, which the prosecution's neuropathologist could not explain; (7) there were no material injuries in the neck-cervical spine evidencing that the infant's head had been whipped back and forth repeatedly; and (8) the medical examiner and the prosecution's neuropathologist agreed with the defense that there was no evidence in the brain tissue that violent shaking had occurred.

The defense's expert witnesses all testified that no violent slamming nor violent shaking of Matthew Eappen's head occurred on February 4, 1997. All of them opined that the injuries were "weeks old", and intermittent bleeding had occurred without any observable signs or symptoms until the fatal re-bleeding occurred on February 4, 1997.

The defense's experts were conceded by the prosecution's experts to be some of the world's pioneering and leading experts in the fields of forensic neuropathology, neuroradiological study of head trauma, neurosurgery, biomechanics of infant head injuries, and forensic pathology. All of the defense experts relied upon, among other things, the eight facts, listed above, which became undisputed during the prosecution's case. The defense's neuropathologist testified that his examination of the dura showed there were capillaries forming in the subdural hematoma which were biological evidence that the injury was weeks old, and that there were osteoblasts (cells which occur at early stages of bone healing - not less than seven days after a fracture) on the external surface of dura at the skull fracture site. The defense experts testified that the type of retinal hemorraghes seen pre-operatively were the result of a change in pressure inside the child's head at the time that he collapsed on February 4, 1997.

A police officer, who was the first person to respond to Louise Woodward's recorded emergency call, testified for the prosecution that Ms. Woodward failed to tell him where the child was when he arrived at the Eappen home. However, his encounter with Ms. Woodward was recorded because she had not yet hung up the phone with the dispatcher when the officer entered the home. The recording showed Ms. Woodward telling the officer, "He's in here! He's in here!"

Another police officer testified that Ms. Woodward admitted to tossing the infant on a bed, being "a little rough with him" and dropping the infant on the bathroom floor, however, the reports he filed with the police department and with the Department of Social Services on the night of the interview made no mention of any such statements and were consistent with Ms. Woodward's trial testimony that she never said such things to the police.

At the defense's request and over the prosecution's objection, the trial judge did not give the jury the option to return a verdict of guilty of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter; hence, the jury's verdict would either be first or second degree murder, or not guilty. After a long deliberation, the jury convicted Ms. Woodward of second degree murder.

Ten days later, the trial judge allowed a defense motion to reduce the verdict to manslaughter. The court then sentenced Ms. Woodward to the nine months imprisonment that she had already served while awaiting and standing trial, and the judge released her.

The prosecution appealed the reduction of the verdict to manslaughter and the "time-served" sentence to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Ms. Woodward also appealed her conviction. She argued that the neuropathology evidence scientifically precluded a guilty finding and that the case should have been dismissed because the prosecution had deprived her experts of access to crucial physical evidence, including pieces of dura and the skull fracture. She also raised other claims of trial error, but stated that these claims need be considered by the court only in the event that the reduction in the verdict or the sentence was overturned. Put another way, Ms. Woodward preferred to accept the reduced manslaughter verdict and time-served sentence and return to her native England, rather than remain in Massachusetts for an undetermined additional period of time in order to stand trial again.

All seven justices rejected the Commonwealth's claim that the trial judge did not have the authority to reduce the verdict to manslaughter. The time-served sentence was upheld by a 4-3 vote, and Ms. Woodward returned to her home in England. She is now studying law in London, having become convinced, by her own trial, on the critical importance of fair legal procedures to safeguard liberty and justice.

©2005 Good & Cormier